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Playing Dolly: Technocultural Formations, Fantasies, and Fictions of Assisted Reproduction,
edited by E. Ann Kaplan and Susan Squier

The Politics of Research,
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Playing Dolly
Technocultural Formations, Fantasies, and Fictions of Assisted Reproduction

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37 (1901): 890–897, quoted in Brian Pace and Micaela Sullivan-Fowler, eds., "JAMA 95 Years Ago," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 276, no. 14 (1996): 1120. Today's diatribes are motivated by similarly suspect sexual politics but also, I claim, by the economics of the health care industry.

3. Chris Ann Raymond, "In Vitro Fertilization Enters Stormy Adolescence As Experts Debate Odds," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 259, no. 4 (1988): 464.
4. Robert Blank and Janna C. Merrick, *Human Reproduction, Emerging Technologies, and Conflicting Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), and American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "Fact Sheet: In Vitro Fertilization," http://www.asrm.org/fact/invitor.html.
5. Peter Neumann, Soheyla D. Gharib, and Milton C. Weinstein, "The Cost of a Successful Delivery with In Vitro Fertilization," *New England Journal of Medicine* 331, no. 4 (1994): 239 and 242.
6. Sharon Begley, "The Baby Myth," *Newsweek*, 4 September 1995, 38–47.
7. D. A. Hidlebaugh et al., "The Cost of Assisted Reproductive Technologies for a Health Maintenance Organization" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 1995), http:///asrm.abstracts.org/1995toc.htm.
8. "Cost of IVF," *USA Today*, 7 April 1998, final ed., sec. D, 1.
9. Neumann, Gharib, and Weinstein, "Cost of a Successful Delivery," 242, and H. M. Shapiro, "Infertility, Quality of Life, and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 1995), http://asrm.abstracts.org/1995toc.htm.
10. "Infertility Clinics Need to Watch Ads," *Healthcare PR & Marketing News* 5, no. 4 (1996): 6.
11. Jane Hodges, "Direct Marketing," *Advertising Age*, 28 October 1996, s1–s2.
12. Janice Raymond, "The Marketing of the New Reproductive Technologies: Medicine, the Media, and the Idea of Progress," *Issues in Reproductive and Genetic Engineering* 3, no. 3 (1990): 253.

Notes Toward a Reproductive Theory of Technology

ANNE BALSAMO

SITUATED AT THE END of part 1 of this book, this essay seeks to elucidate the contributions offered by the work collected here to the development of a reproductive theory of technology. I begin by presenting a set of assumptions about technology in order to establish a working definition of the term. By the end I suggest that even though "reproductive technologies" are the focal technological "objects" of these essays, the arguments that unfold describe the various ways in which all technologies reproduce cultural arrangements. In this sense, all technologies can be considered *reproductive* technologies. This assertion, discussed in different forms by feminist scholars such as Zoë Sofoulis, Donna Haraway, and Paula Treichler (among others), is one of the strongest insights to emerge from recent feminist studies of new reproductive technologies.[1] This insight has inspired my own work on the body and technology and in the construction of feminist multimedia; and just as this essay builds on the accumulated insights of other feminist scholars, so, too, will a more fully elaborated theory emerge from the collective analyses now going on in the name of feminist studies of science, technology, and medicine.

A Beginning Point

It is by now common to assert that technology must, first and foremost, be understood as a postdisciplinary object. This is to say that there is no discipline of study that has not taken up the issue of technology whether in its "object form" as an artifact, tool, or material practice or in its "subject form" as a topic of discussion, analysis, philosophy, or set of techniques. This assertion

echoes an observation made by Teresa de Lauretis more than a decade ago, that technology has become "our context"—regardless of how one defines the identity of "our" in that statement.[2] The differential distribution and use of technological resources across the globe do not negate this observation; more than a few cultural critics have noted that even with global disparities in access to technology and in levels of technological infrastructure, and indeed in the value placed on technology as part of an epistemological worldview, there are few places in the world that exist "outside" the technological reach of multinational capitalism. Given that this historically specific form of capitalism is significantly supported by the technologies of communication, command, and control—those networks of power Haraway calls the "informatics of domination"—we can see how right de Lauretis is in asserting that "technology is our context, political and personal."

To claim that technology is a postdisciplinary object suggests that it no longer properly belongs to the special few (the philosophers, the engineers). Instead this suggests that thinkers in several disciplines might have something important to contribute to our collective understanding of the "nature" of technology. In fact, this interdisciplinary influence is evident in the work of those who are considered to be the most noteworthy philosophers of technology: Jacques Ellul, for example, grounds his approach to the philosophy of technology in an analysis of modern society, offering a detailed sociological assessment of the way in which technology has become the defining characteristic of advanced industrial societies. Even though most contemporary philosophers have moved beyond thinking about technology strictly in relation to science, as marked by the formulation that once held sway that technology was "applied science," there is still significant debate surrounding the proper approach to defining technology: Should it be defined anthropologically as what human beings actually do, or sociologically as a consequence of particular social relations, or epistemologically as a specific form of knowledge? So even as philosophers themselves continue to wrestle with classic philosophical concerns pertaining to technology, concerns that address the ethics, morality, and metaphysics of technology, the field itself recognizes that the intellectual insights and habits of analysis required to understand technology may need to come from other places.[3]

If we review the insights drawn from the work of scholars in feminist studies, we encounter a different approach to the problem of defining technology. Less concerned with the elucidation of the underlying ontological or epistemological nature of technology or of *techne*, these scholars collectively suggest a slightly different, but in the end no less philosophical, definition as a starting point for the analysis of technology: technology is a manifestation of cultural values. Rather than debating an essentialist definition of the "nature"

of technology as "tool," "means," or specific form of knowledge, this definitional statement expresses an understanding about the way in which technology manifests the material world. It is an antiessentialist statement in that although it is semantically structured as a definition (*technology is x*), by inserting the phrase "a manifestation of cultural values," this definition makes technology *not* an equivalence between *objects* but rather the equivalent of a *process* of making and revealing.

In one sense, this approach is consistent with Heidegger's view that technology is part of the existential structure of human "being." Moreover, it seems compatible with his notion of "technics," which for him is the term for a technological habit that can never be understood in isolation from human being but rather should be considered a means of "being-making." Zoë Sofoulis affirms Heidegger's view and its compatibility with a feminist theory of technology when she writes:

> Heidegger proposes that we cannot hope to properly reflect upon and understand the character of modern technology by merely staring at the technological. Instead we must inquire into what our technologies tell us about our ways of seeing and revealing the world, and be alert to the danger that we will ourselves be obliviously claimed by a technological ordering, will look on ourselves as available resources, and fail to see our own part in bringing the world and ourselves to this point. Likewise, we are mistaken to understand technological arts in terms of techniques and tools alone. Instead we must reflect upon what modes of revealing they present, what questions they pose about dominant forms of technological revelation, what glimpses of alternative configurations they offer.[4]

Here Sofoulis reminds us of Heidegger's concern that people can be "claimed by a technological ordering" when they begin to see themselves and their world through a technological optic. This warning hints at the complex nature of technological agency—a topic that I will return to at the end of this essay. But on the issue of the process of understanding technology, Sofoulis is right to point out that it was Heidegger who argued that we cannot "hope to understand the character of modern technology by merely staring at the technology." To this end, Heidegger suggests a broader definition of technology whereby technology is understood not as a set of techniques or even tools but rather as *a total arrangement of life*. In an article titled "The Aristotelian vs. Heideggerian Approach to the Problem of Technology," Webster Hood elaborates Heidegger's thinking on this point:

> Technics are never used in isolation; they always occur as members in a context of technics, a totality of tools, implements, machines,

> materials, energies and other items of use. Such contexts include more than technics and useful items; we will see later that science and persons are also included. To emphasize the spatial function of technics in experience, let us call an arrangement of technics a "context-totality"—the expression being synonymous with the terms complex, pattern, system. Heidegger gives no detailed explication of contextual-totalities, but provides some examples: the carpenter's workshop, the shoemaker's shop, a house with different rooms, a railroad platform, a construction site, a street.[5]

If we consider the examples given, that is, the carpenter's workshop, a house with different rooms, a construction site, a street, the definition of technology implied by Heidegger—even if it is not fully elaborated by him—is one that includes much more than the object notions of tools or techniques. What else is included can be gleaned from the examples listed: tools and techniques, certainly, but also people, professional and artisanal activities, functions, infrastructures, points of circulation, and so on. Thus we can borrow from Heidegger an insight about the phenomenological process of technology as "being-making" and his sense of the character of technology as being multiform, that is, a pattern, a system, or an arrangement. The key insight Heidegger offers to the project of building a feminist theory of technology is, as Sofoulis suggests, the admonition to focus on "modes of revealing" presented by a technological arrangement, as well as the "glimpses of alternative configurations they offer." This is consistent with and amplifies insights gathered from feminist studies of new reproductive technologies (NRT)—that the technological arrangements (of which NRT are a part of) reveal deeply embedded ideological beliefs about the nature of the female body, the meaning of gender differences, and the privilege of heterosexuality. The practice of feminist criticism is, in this sense, the act of making the "mode of revealing" evident and of narrating the logic whereby some of the possible or "alternative configurations" are promoted and formally sanctioned, while other possibilities are foreclosed and outlawed.

The key difference between Heidegger's view and a feminist definition of technology is the extent to which technology is defined as a part of an unchanging "nature" of the human being, and the extent to which this "nature" transcends history, erases gender and race, and obscures notions of positionality and location. In this sense, what technology manifests or reveals, that is, cultural values, is not something reducible to objects or things, nor is it an essential and historically unchanging aspect of human "being." Rather, I am suggesting that we consider technology as a complex cultural arrangement that is determined by cultural forces that precede it, as it also organizes and reproduces those forces over time.

A Reproductive Model of Technology's Reproductive Mode

To assert that technologies manifest cultural values still leaves everything to say about the characteristic form of the manifestation and the meaning of the cultural values revealed. Drawing on recent work in cultural theory, especially work by Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Stuart Hall, and Jennifer Slack, a fuller elaboration of this definition explains that technologies are best thought of as an "ensemble" or an "articulated arrangement." As will be familiar to many readers, this assertion draws on Gramscian articulation theory and Raymond Williams's work on cultural formations. Articulation is defined as a process of meaning construction whereby one unit of the ensemble or formation acquires meaning in part through the relationship with or attachment to other units of the ensemble. The process of articulation—which is the process through which meaning is constructed by the forging of associations and of semiotic codings—expresses a nuanced similarity to the process of second-order signification discussed by Roland Barthes, where the meaning of any one sign within a system of signs is in part constructed through the association with other signs, both through associations of identity (equivalence) and difference (dissimilarity). In contrast to the Heideggerian sense of the technological totality as "contextual-totalities," where the examples included "the carpenter's workshop, a house with different rooms," and so on, this notion of articulation implies that a key dimension to the elucidation of any technological formation is the historical and cultural specificity of a particular arrangement.

The cumulative effect of the articulation or arrangement is the reproduction of specific cultural values. The central question that emerges from this formulation concerns the meaning of the term *reproduction*. As Michelle Barrett reminds us in her book *Women's Oppression Today*, there are at least three "analytically distinct referents of the concept [of reproduction]—social reproduction, reproduction of the labor force, or biological reproduction."[6] The project of thinking through the way in which technological formations serve to reproduce cultural values can take as a starting point any one of these referents. For example, Marilyn Strathern begins with a biological notion of reproduction to explicate the process whereby anthropology as an academic discipline will unfold in the future. In her chapter "Reproducing Anthropology," she offers an encapsulated account of the genetic theory of human reproduction as it involves two procreative processes: one the process of heredity, the other the process of development. Reproduction is the means whereby constitutive material (DNA in this case) has "an effect either when it is replicated (as a genotype or genome) or when the genotype is in turn expressed (as a phenotype)."[7] This dual process of replication and expression, of heredity and development, is at the heart of the "reproductive model" that Strathern

is keen to elaborate in the aim of understanding the hopes that academics hold for the future of the field of anthropology. Although she is careful to situate this "reproductive model" in a particular Euro-American view of procreation, she notes that it offers an interesting approach to think about such issues as continuity, change, potentiality, and the future, both as these apply to the intellectual work of anthropology as a discipline and as they mark our thinking about the nature of human identity and individuality. In fact, throughout her discussion of the reproductive model, she draws explicitly on the discourse of reproductive technologies, especially statements made by Warnock and others in the debates that preceded the formulation of the 1990 Human Fertilization and Embryology Act.

Strathern's model identifies the processes that need to be elaborated in the project of understanding the reproductive dynamics of technological formations. These include the manifestation of continuity, of development, of change, and of potentiality. In addition to this list of *processes*, we can also begin to identify the *elements* that constitute a technological formation. These include:

- Devices and artifacts/tools and techniques
- Forms of knowledge (*techne* and technics)
- Reified human labor
- Material conditions of production/reproduction
- Forms of embodiment
- Cultural narratives
- Aesthetic properties
- Institutional forms and policies
- Economies (systems of value)
- Codified social relations
- Circuits of exchange or patterns of circulation

These elements itemize the multiform "nature" of technology. In this sense, what "counts" as a technology are the articulated elements of a particular formation. The reproductive dynamic of the technological formation will also involve those processes Strathern identified: the manifestation of continuity, of development, of change, and of potentiality. The nature of these processes are difficult to define precisely because they refer to differences that are manifested over time and understood relationally, either as a relation between two states—the meaning of continuity, for example, implies an equivalence between two states or moments—or, as in the case of the concept of potentiality, as a relation between what is possible and what is manifested. In addition to accounting for the actual processes of reproduction, a fuller elaboration of a reproductive theory of technology would also need to account for the way

in which the elements are articulated—or "sutured"—one to another. Although such an account of the forces of articulation is beyond the scope of this essay, I would like to discuss this set of theoretical assertions in the context of the feminist work included in this collection. These essays not only describe the multiform shape of the technological formation of technologically assisted reproduction but also describe in more concrete and historical detail how specific cultural values are actually reproduced.

Reproductive Technologies as Technologies of Reproduction

Not surprisingly, the different projects represented here illuminate different aspects of the technological formation built around new reproductive technologies—some take as a starting point the "object form" of new reproductive technologies, others focus on the cultural narratives that invest these technologies with meaning. What they share is an attempt to understand the way in which the new reproductive technologies are implicated in the reproduction of ideologies of the gendered, race-marked, and class-positioned body. In the first essay in part 1, Dion Farquhar takes as her subject the circulation of human body parts in the form of gamete traffic. Although this is a highly specific set of practices bordering on the science fictional, what she also elaborates is an understanding about the institutional processes of technological reproduction—where what is being reproduced is not just bodies but also desires, cultural identities, and subject formations. Thus, in describing the gendered nature of gamete traffic, Farquhar describes how

> gamete traffic is driven by difference—the circulating, supplementing, and hybridizing desires, fantasies, and identities of their users, suppliers, and administrators. . . . So, for example, the technique of ovum donation stimulates new demands and desires—for instance, for peri- and postmenopausal pregnancy—which in turn steer themselves into the flow of gamete traffic, seeking a solution through the expansion of childbearing capacity offered by prosthesis. The relation between desire and technology, however, is reciprocal. While desire for technology sometimes exacerbates the development of a technology, an existing technology always also stimulates and proliferates essentially unpredictable desires and fantasies.

The focus of Farquhar's essay is on the unintended consequences of gamete traffic, including the production of new agents of reproduction, of new cultural "conundrums," and of new social ways of being. Thus Farquhar sets forth a reading that suggests how this technological formation produces change out of potentiality. The technological fragmentation of maternity into "genetic (ovum-providing), gestational (uterus-providing), and social-legal (nurturance-

providing)" sets up new possibilities for kinship relations. In her discussion of the circulatory dynamic of gamete donation, she reminds readers that the process of reproductive medicalization is not monolithic—not only does it set up different possibilities for different participants, but the effects of the process are not totalizing: donors are not all victims, recipients are not all privileged, and physicians are not all empowered. Her strongest claim argues that "it is impossible to construe gamete traffic along a binary model—as either inherently repressive or liberatory." Rather, she argues for the need to appreciate the contestation that animates the technological formation and offers suggestions for tracking its dynamic unfolding.

With a similar sensibility, Angela Wall analyzes Norplant implants as a technological device that has contradictory consequences tied to its use by women who are situated in different networks of social and economic relations. As Wall explains, "Norplant is an economic benefit to women who cannot afford to have another child or who do not want to confront the alternatives to another pregnancy." At the same time, Norplant is also touted as a judicial tool that could assist in the state's regulation of the birth options of low-income women. Thus Norplant is simultaneously defined as a technique of empowerment and of disempowerment. What Wall shows is how the "meaning" of Norplant—as a device and tool—is a result of the articulation between the device, cultural beliefs about "worthy mothers" and "monstrous mothers," and forms of embodiment that themselves are a consequence of bodily practices, economic conditions, and cultural narratives about race-marked bodies.

Pam Moore's analysis of the industry of reproductive medicine offers a historically concrete description of the economics of infertility treatment and the way in which the reproductive medical industry exemplifies a post-Fordist logic of late capitalism. To this end Moore analyzes the role of advertising in the reproduction and naturalization of reproductive technologies. By investigating the marketing aspects of reproductive medicine, Moore addresses the interesting edges of the technological formation of new reproductive technologies where it intersects and collides with other cultural formations. For example, in discussing the claims made in certain infertility treatment center ads, she reports that the Federal Trade Commission had to step in and regulate the kinds of claims (about rates of pregnancy) that could be included in an advertisement. Apparently the FTC has banned the inclusion of explicit guarantees and now requires that advertised pregnancy rates be supported by reliable scientific evidence. This suggests one way in which the technological formation of new reproduction technologies reproduces the process of biological reproduction as a commodity that can be institutionally regulated just as are other commodities. The emergence of a reproductive medical industry attests to the fact that the business of life has never been better.

Susan Squier offers a clear analysis of one of the most potent and far-ranging consequences of the practice of new reproductive technologies: the reconstruction of new identities for fetuses and mothers, and the wholesale refashioning of the fetal/material relation. In tracing through the construction of these new identities, where the fetus is constructed as a subject with rights while the mother is cast as a threat to those rights, Squier is careful to remind us that this situation—of the increasing subjectification of the fetus and the desubjectification of the mother—does not result *simply* from the development and deployment of these new technologies; to argue thus would be to locate agency solely with the technologies in question. While she remains committed to the understanding that these technologies do play a significant role in the reconstruction of these identities and the reconfiguration of rights and ethics, Squier offers a more complex analysis of how these technologies acquire a determining force. She does this by reviewing the changing historical relationship between the fetus and the mother to suggest that it has long been the case that medical practitioners and indeed culture more broadly have had "notorious difficulty in ascertaining and accurately representing the subject position, desires, needs, and capacities" of gestating women. Moving from a consideration of literary representations of the fetus/mother relation, Squier turns her attention to an analysis of the 1994 Final Report of the NIH's Human Embryo Research Panel; in so doing, Squier illustrates the multiple ways that cultural narratives get constructed and circulate within literary genres as well as nonliterary forms. Specifically she draws our attention to a site where discourse meets materiality—where the discursive construction of maternal identity and fetal subjectification becomes materialized as panel reports get translated into policy statements that guide research practices and the development of (reproductive) technological protocols.

The role played by cultural narratives in the articulation of the meaning of new reproductive technologies cannot be underestimated. In her reading of "surrogacy narratives," E. Ann Kaplan addresses a different aspect of the technological formation—that of the ideological positions circulated in different surrogacy narratives. Kaplan describes two sets of popular narratives, ones where "sisterly motives abound" (where the motives for participating in a surrogacy relationship are expressed in terms of sisterly duty, devotion, or responsibility) and others (which Kaplan calls "negative" narratives) that "reveal antitechnology sentiments and dwell on 'unsisterly practices.'" She notes that these sets of narratives "set up a false binary" between competing polemics that fails not only to recognize the multiple positions that participants actually occupy but also to address the multiple lines of force (such as economics, class, and race) that determine and structure the surrogacy situation. Thus she illustrates how cultural narratives about women's experiences with a particular

technology gain the status of myth and function to delimit what can be said and thought about the meaning of a new technology. Her essay also shows how the technological formation of new reproductive technologies reproduces received cultural values of an earlier arrangement through the articulation between cultural narratives and myths (of "mother-constructs," for example) and new mother-child configurations made possible by the application of new technologies.

Other projects offer a more historical approach to the study of the technological formation of new reproductive technologies and in so doing illuminate the processes whereby the formation both continues and revises previous articulations. For example, Karyn Valerius argues that the philosophical issues raised by the current practice of assisted reproduction and the recent deployment of reproductive technologies are best understood in relation to a set of questions that were answered in the nineteenth century. She situates the contemporary U.S. public discourse on assisted reproduction in relation to a historical understanding of Western traditions of monstrosity. The historical trajectory she traces includes early modern accounts of "monstrous births" as due to supernatural intervention as well as Aristotle's "imagination" theory that attributed monstrous births to the mental state of the mother during conception. Valerius suggests that the "imagination theory" of monstrosity was overturned in part because of broad epistemological shifts brought about by the rise of science and biologism in particular. Thus she offers an illustration of how this contemporary technological formation revives and revises—in effect, imperfectly reproduces—a particular epistemological worldview that is contradictorily scientistic and biological but also superstitious and irrational.

A Feminist Theory of Technology

If we take the work collected here as indicative of the range of scholarship going on in the name of feminist science and technology studies, we can see how it is a collective project that is less concerned with debating the ontological underpinnings of a theory of technology as it is with trying to think through the technological conditions of possibilities of social transformation. These feminist projects situate their "objects of study"—reproductive technologies—within a cultural matrix of social practices, discourses, and institutions. In so doing, they describe how technological devices are one—but only one—element of that matrix. More to the point, these essays illustrate the multiform meaning of the term *technology* and argue implicitly for the importance of developing a multimediated theory of technology. By multimediated I mean that the theory that is being constructed will necessarily take inspiration and guiding questions from various disciplines and intellectual methodologies. Even as this theory will be built across disciplinary traditions and through the application of different methods of analysis, the political horizon remains consistent with feminist work more broadly. This is to say that the ultimate aim of constructing such analyses of this technological formation is to illuminate the possibilities of transformation and reformation now and in the future.

Notes

1. Zoë Sofoulis, "Exterminating Fetuses: Abortion, Disarmament, and the Sexo-semiotics of Extraterrestrialism," *Diacritics* 14, no. 2 (1984): 47–59.
2. Teresa de Lauretis, "Signs of Wa/onder," in *The Technological Imagination: Theories and Fictions*, ed. Teresa de Lauretis, Andreas Huyssen, and Kathleen Woodward (Madison, Wisc.: Coda Press, 1980), 167.
3. Indeed, in the introduction to their edited collection called *Philosophy and Technology* (New York: Free Press, 1972), Carl Mitchem and Robert Mackey write: "But precisely because technology is intimately involved with practical affairs, the stimulus to develop a philosophy of technology is more than just philosophical. It also arises from economic, social, political and environmental problems" (30). In the end, they argue for the primacy of the philosophical approach, especially in the face of the judgment that "technology needs to be humanized": "the conception one has of technology ultimately determines whether, after philosophical issues have been exhausted, what remains is an economic, social or political problem. The issue of humanizing technology is, at its foundation, philosophical rather than simply social or political" (30).
4. Zoë Sofoulis, "Interdictions, Intersections, Interfacing: Women, Technology, Art, and Philosophy," Julian Branshaw Memorial Lecture, Sydney, Australia, 1993. Quotation is from page 11.
5. Hood cited in Mitchem and Mackey, *Philosophy and Technology*, 356.
6. Michelle Barrett, *Women's Oppression Today*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1980), 21. Although Barrett does address some of the theoretical problems attendant to the project of thinking about women's oppression in the context of these different forms of reproduction, her broader project is to evaluate the usefulness of Marxist theory in light of a gendered analysis of the nature of social reproduction. Thus she focuses on ideologies of gender, of class, and of the family and on the forms of gendered subjectivity as these are implicated in the processes central to the reproduction of the labor force. She reminds us of the critical insights offered by Louis Althusser on the nature of social reproduction and argues that his work that emphasized "the familial and ideological spheres—in contrast to classical Marxism's obsessional focus on production and the world of wage labor" offers a theoretical opening for "thinking gender" in the context of the reproduction of capitalism. This latter concern leads Barrett to evaluate closely and eventually dismiss theoretical claims made about women's role in the reproduction of capitalist relations of production based (solely) on their biological role in the process of human reproduction. For example, she rightly criticizes the biologism inherent in arguing that the gendered division of labor (which supports capitalist class relations) is a consequence of women's bodily experience with menstruation, pregnancy, lactation and child care.
7. Marilyn Strathern, "Reproducing Anthropology,"in *Reproducing the Future: Anthropology, Kinship, and the New Reproductive Technologies* (New York: Routledge, 1992): 163–182.